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In exarm~mg the deregulaUon of mterclty transportation, Winston emphastzes the role of quantitative calculations m persuading policy makers to adopt reform He also examines the role of sophisticaUon m model bmldmg, finding that the predictive accuracy of the economlc analyses that were done depended not on the complexaty of the analytical models use& but on whether or not major structural adjuslrnents (such as the development of hub and spoke mr networks) were anticipated and included m the models. Thus it is often the incisiveness of the econormc insight, not the completeness of Its elaboration, that is most crucml Furthermore, the persuasiveness of economac analysis to policy makers may depend more on the credibility of such simple arguments than on the more complex modeling efforts that quite rightly influence professionals
In this paper, I exarmne how econormc analysis call elucidate some well-known problems of urban transportation m the Umted States (1) failing infrastructure, (2) financially weak pubhc transit; (3) environmental impacts of transportation, (4) motor-vehmte accidents, and (5) traffic congesBon In each case I argue that basic econolmc argumems can help steer pohcy away from unproducttve chrections Furthermore, relatively simple quantitative calculations can play an important role in tmderstandmg some of these problems and m defining the categories of potential policy responses to them that are most prolmsmg Winston and Bosworth (1992) provide an insightful survey of the state of U.S pubhc Infrastructure Over the past two decades, the nation has seen a sharp decline in the percentage of its gross national product (GNP) devoted to gross investment in mfrastructltre, from nearly four percent m the late 1960s to 2¼ percent m 1990 The total value of the capital stock has declined smnlarly as a percentage of national product, from 49 percent of GNP m 1970 to 41 percent m 1990 These declines have occurred "at all levels of government and .. across a broad range of different types of capital' (Winston and Bosworth, 1992, p 268) One of the largest categories affected by these trends ~s transportauon infrastructure, especially roads, and one of the most visible manifestations of these trends is the physical deterioration of highways, bridges, and subways Some of these dechnes are natural reductions from a peak m mfrastructure expenditures that occurred during the 1960s due to rapidly increasing school enrolments, suburbamzation, and the beginning of an ambmous Interstate highway system Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that unprovmg the pubhc infrastructure would now have a high rate of return This ewdence includes macroeconom~c studies of the relalaonslmp between public infrastructure and productivity (Munnell, 1992) and mlcroeconomac studms of the costs and benefits of specific lt~vestments (U S. Congresmonal Budget Office, !988). C-ramhch (1994) provldzs a cauUous and insightful review of evidence and pohcy Jmphcations A conclusion drawn by many is that the Umted States needs to spend more on pubhc infrastructure In fact, the nation is already movml; m that darecUon since its low point m the early 1980s, investment m pubhc infrastructure has risen, as a fraction of GNP, from 2 0 percent to about 2.25 percent, core mfrastructure spending m particular has increased substantially m real terms, from about $21 bilhon to $32 billion (1992 dollars) m the case of roads 1 For highways and bridges, it see~ms that current spending levels, ff maintained as a fraction of GNP, would be sufficient to mamtmn conchtions as they were m 1989. This still leaves some sigmficnnt deficmncles, but at least is a better prognos~s than a few years ago The mov: recent federal highway leglslataon, the Inlermodal Surface Transport,anon Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, should continue and perhaps accelerate the trend tow~trd larger capital expendltttres on highways However, tktere is little guarantee that these new expendlmres v~ll be targeted to those measure~ that are most useful A large portion of new spending m ISTEA ~s for speclaI highway projects, a category heavily dependent on pohtical conslderatlons mid wl~ a poor track record (Winston and Bosworth, 1992 , p 287) I-hgh federal share,,, and biases m favor of capital intensive projects have been demonstrated lo cause mefficlencms m a variety of types of infrastructure projects, especially mass transit. Often projects are chstnbuted widely in order to achieve a pohtically viable d~strlbutaon of expenditures, rather than targeted to those areas where rates o] return are highest.
Failing i~tfrastructure
Furthermore, pricing policies often cause Infrastructure to be built to accommodate mefficmnt numbers and mixes of users (Winston, 1991) In the case highways, capacity must accommodate peak traffic volumes that are unrestrained by any slgmfic,ant pncmg, these volumes are further mflate~d by employer-provided parking subslcaes, which are m turn strongly encouraged by the federal tax code and by many -~aumclpal planmng ordanances (Wfllson and Shoup, 1990) Furthermore, a lack cf lmcmg mcenuves on heavy trucks causes them to mipose "damage to pavements that could be greatly reduced wlth relalavely inexpensive reconfigurations of their axles Small et al, 1989) In the case of an'ports, lanchng fees that bear httle relationship to use of scarce peak runway capacity result in too many fhghts at peak hours and too many small private mrplanes clogging the busiest commercial airports (Momson and Winston, 1989) Research suggests that opttmazmg investment strategaes and better managing the mfrastruct~are through pricing can create measurable and very iarge reductions m the cost of provlchng any gnven level of infrastructure servtces For example, Small Wmston and Bosworth (1992) , Figs 8-1, 8-2, wdtated to 1992 pnezs using consumer price index for all items, frora U S Bureau of the Cen,~ns (1993) , table 756 K A Small I Regwnal Science and Urban Econonucs 27 (1997) 671-691 et al. (1989, p. 53) Identify. annual cost reductmns for the U S road system, excluding bridges, that amount to $11.3 bflhon at 1992 pnces Therefore the effecuve amount of useful mfmslructure can be substanuaUy increased without necessarily increasing the long-run costs of investment
3, Fhmncially pressed mass transit
Mass translt servace m the Umted States, poor as it is compared to Europe. absorbs enormous subslches u about $13 5 b~llion m 1993, roughly a twelve-fold increase an real terms since 1970. 2 About haft of this increase occurred during the 1970s and was a source of local and state fiscal crises (Plckrell, 1983) .
Transit subslches have attracted conslderable attenuon from profess~onaA economasts, and as a dxrect result the mgredaents for understanding tbas phenomenon are at hand F~rst and foremost, as Mohnng (1972) has shown, public transit (like any serrate performed m batches) is subject to sharply increasing returns scale when one takes into account the value to users of tugher route densxty and service frequency. If demand on a pamcular corridor nses, the transit provxder serving that comdor can respond an one of several ways If vehacles are not fully occupied, or ff larger velucles can be operated at httie adchtmnal cost. the provider nnght choose to handle the extra passengers samply by mamtatmng the same routes wath the same servace frequency, allowing average cost to dechne. AltemaUvely, the provlder can increase route denslty and/or servace frequency, wbach produces cost savings to passengers m the form of less walking or wmtmg tune In eather case, total average cost (to provider and users) declines. A different way of putting the same point as that given a particular level of service, as measured by the density of routes and the frequency of vel~cles on a given route, handhng an add~taonal passenger costs httle extra because it 6oes not necessitate extra vebacles or dr~ers From the point of wew of econormc theory, thin is the primary justfficataon for transat subs~ches Nash (1988) offers a clear formal exposmon of tbas argument and an enhghtenmg apphcataon of it to pohey toward pnvauzauon of transit Thxs property of increasing returns to scale, however, greatly hmats the vaab~hty of mass transit m the Umted States because populataon denslty there is so low For example, the U S populauon is about the same as the combined populaUons of Germany, Italy, the U.IC, and France, but it occupies more than six tunes the area (U S Bureau of the Census, 1995, table 1361) It is no surprise that tbas relative 2The figure quoted ~s total expenses rmnus operating revenues, from U $ Bureau of the Census (1995, Fmhng tc recogmze these facts, polmy makers m the Umted States have tried to increase tmaslt patronage by expandmg transit service far into suburban areas preclsely where it has the least market potential Meanwhile, they have failed to take full advantage of two of translt's most natural markets (Meyer and GomezIbanez, 1981 , ch 3)" low-income tuner-city residents, who have been relatwely neglected ~, a market, and high-income commuters to central business &stncts, who have been served by bmldmg new rail translt lines, an extraordinarily expensive method m most locatmns where xt has been adopted m recent years The results have been &sappomtmg nderstup and debihtalaag subslches Furthermore, the subsldms appear to have encouraged dramatic increases m management personnel and m umon wage rates, snnultaneous with a substantml fall m labor productlwty as measured~ for example, by vehmle-hours per driver-hour (Pmkrell, 1983 . Lave, 1991 One posssble response to l~gh subssdy costs is to radmall~ change the msatutlonal structure of mass transit through pnvat~zaraon Econormsts have taken an actsve and constwact~ve role m analyzing private markets for mass transit services and m pre&ctmg the impacts of various proposals (see Small, 1992 , pp 143-151, for a rewew) A wide variety of experiments m Bntmn, the Umted States, and elsewhere are provsdmg a wealth of data to test these sdeas (Dodgson, 1991; Talvme et al, 1991 , Bamster et al, 1992 , Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993 , Wt~te, I995) Wl,ale economssts are far from reaching consensus on all the detzals, tbas work has narrowed the range of controversy considerably, mainly to how extens!vely and m just what contractual form private firms should be brought into the pmture. For example, debate continues on how successful deregu|ataon of Bntash bus transit has been, but st is w~dely agreed that it has lowered costs and that competmve tendenng for servmes, as praclaced m London, reaps many ff not all of the cost savings of more complete deregulataon It ~s also w~dely agreed that bus trark~at is not a perfectly contestable industry, leawag at least some scope for monopoly pricing under full deregulatmn aDefimt~ve comparisons of urban densmes are Impossible due to the &fficulty of defining comparabIe urban areas One attempt is made by U S Bureau of the Census (1993, tabIe 1377), wl~ch defines an urban area as a conunuous built-up area including locatmns wlth populataon density, at least 5000 per squm~ male Among the world's 50 most populous urban areas by this criterion, those in Europe and the Umted States had 1992 populatmn densmes (m thousands per square ~anle) averaging 27.2 mad 9 4, respectavely The dens~taes of the m&vldual crees, m decreasing order of total populaaon, were New York (11 5), Moscow (27 8), Los Angeles (9 1), London (10 5), Pans (19 9), Essen Chicago (8 5), Milan (13 7), St Petersburg (33 4), Madrid 3), Barc elona (48 5), San Fran cisco (9 4), Manchester (11 2), and Ptuladelphm (8 K A Small / Regional Science and Urban Economzcs 27 (t997) Another possible response is to shaft the responslblhty for provldang transit subsidies to local governments, m hopes that local taxpayers wall dasc~phne the translt agencies to prowde only cost-effecuve services Econormsts could be more proacUve here by further developing techmques to weigh the theoreUcal benefits of subslches against the leakage of benefits that can occur, due for example to the bagh marginal cost of raasmg pubhc funds or to wasteful expen&tures One &stnbutlonal consideration ~s especially m need of more econon'uc evaluauon. How should we transport people who cannot &ave* W~th the leading edge of the U S "baby boom" now batting 50 years of ages it will not be long before that quesUon takes on greater promanence 
Environmental effects of transportation
The effects of transportation on the envlronment cons~tute an enormous subject with a l~gh pohtacal profile It ts treated, for example, by Bamster and Button (1993) Perh~tps m no other area of transportation pohcy have writers dascussed passionately rahe role of motor vebactes
In order to provlde a quantltatave background for flus and the next two problems conslderexl, I hst m Table 1 some estimates of typtcal costs of ckavmg an automobile m urban areas m the Umted States. The figures are intended to represent average social costs, they therefore exclude taxes and the marginal externahty costs associated with congesuon. They also exclude enwronmental costs, due to the great uncertmntaes m estimating them However, several qmte sopl~stlcated studies attempt to estimate certain categories of enwronmental costs, notably air pollution and global warming The argument that follows is restricted to these two zategones of environmental effects
Estmlates of mr pollution costs use a variety of methods including direct assessment of health costs, staUstacal correlations between atr poUutaon and mortahty, sm'veys asking people how much they value specifically described environmental amentraes, and stalastacal stu&es relating ~ pollulaon to residential property values. The resullang lmphcatlons for aggregate costs from the pollutaon caused by gasohne-powered vebacles m the Umted States appear to be on the order of $10-50 bllIion per year for the early 1990s 4 This is approxunately $0 007 to $0 037 per w~bacle-nule, or roughly $900 to $4400 over the hfe of each car 5 4This is my assessment of the most reasonable range for damages resulung from all enusslons of carbon monoxide, hydrocarl~ons, and mtrogen oxades (including secondary products such as ozone), which may be ud¢en as roughly represenlmg the problems caused by gasohne-powered vehicles The figures gaven are oughly the central values found m a variety of often conflicting studies For example, Small, 1977 , estimates t970 U S costs from these poUutants at $5 38 bllhon, but uses a value of life substantially lower than current esrarnates based on labor-market behawor toward rh~k (Small, 1992, 83 ) U S Feder~ I-hghway Admamstrat~on, 1982, p E-47) uses estwaates, derived from Haugaard, 1981 , that sum t~ $25 bdhon for 1981 Krupmck and Pormey, 1991, p 524) , on the other hand, estwaate only $0 25 to $1 0 btll~on m benefits from a 35 percent reduc~on m reactive hydrocarbon enuss~ons The Los Angeles region, where ozone is a serious automoUce-related mr-qnahty problem. typically accotmt~ for a substantial fraction of such estimates, recent e,,t~mates of the health costs of exceeding the federal ozone standards m the Los Angeles region range from $0 3 b~Ihon (Knapmck and Portney, 1991) to $27 bdhon (Hall et at, 1992, Sinai1 and Kaz~rm, 1995) Based on the assumption that alI economac damages are from ermss~ons m urban areas, and the esramate of 1363 bdhon velucleomdes of urban travel m 1992 [AAMA (1995), p 65] I also assume average vetucle It et~me maleage of 120 000 males, tlus ts a downward ad3ustment from what would be calculated from tt'~e average vehicle usage of 12 458 n-ales Ob~d, p 64) and an average ve~cle hfe of 12 years, wtuch ~, the medmn re~rement age of a 1979 model car as calculated from tb~d, p 39, the adjustment being reqmred because newer cars are more numerous m the vetucle populaaon and are driven more than older oars Small and Kazmu (1995) esumate the costs of automolave ewassmns Souther~ California, whose population density, topography, and chmate make pollution especially severe, to be $0 03 per male using wad-range assumpaons K A Small / Regional Sctence and Urban Economws 27 (1997) Clearly these magmtudes allow for the posslblhty that a noticeable increase m the price of a car could be jusUfied for technology that ehmmated many of these costs On the other hand, the per-male cost estmaates are not very large compared to those categories reported in Table 1 that are now privately borne, charging externahty taxes based on these estamates would therefore not make much change m the overall pnvate cost of driving, so would not reduce much reducUon m automobile use Global warming due to the greenhouse effect is more difficult to analyze because the magmtude of the effects are so dependent on poorly understood scientific relatlonsbaps, and the chmf economac impacts are far m the future Chne (1991) and Nordhaus (1991b) provide excellent reviews. It is clear that current carbon choxlde emissions may dlsrapt the future chmate, but any cost estamates are highly speculatave. Instead of using such cost estamates, I consider estamates of the shadow value of carbon &oxide ermsslons m scenarios where pohlacal decisions reqmre specified reducuons The reductaons considered are substautmlly more strmgent than any decisions taken so far Nordhaus (1991a, p. 50) finds that a pohcy that reduces carbon dioxide emasslons by 50 percent from thetr projected base path, at each point mtmae, would entad a marginal cost of carbon abatement m the neighborhood of $143 per ton ($0 16 per kilogram) of carbon removed Tins zs nearly twice as large as carbon tax that was proposed m the European Commumty in 1991 (Du Bols, 1992) Manne and R~chels (1992, pp 51, 59 , 60) estm-mte the marginal value ena~sslon rights that would prevatl in a rather different curtailment scenario one in which the U.S maintains its carbon choxade enusslons at thelr 1990 rate for ten years, reduces them gradually to 80 percent of that rate during the next ten years, then stabihzes them at that lower level The shadow value begins at about $140 per ton carbon, then oscillates and eventually stabilizes at $208 per ton Clme (1992, pp 54-61) finds this to be near the upper end of the range of values produced by several models reviewed.
I therefore take $140-$208 per ton (1990 pnces) as representang a reasonable range of estmaates of the shadow value of carbon ermsslons under foreseeable lnternatmnal agreements or domestac political decisions Updated to 1992 prices, these figures are eqtuvalent to $0 45-$0 67 per gallon of gasohne, or $0 021-$0.031 per vebacle-male. 6 Tins is similar to the range quoted above for the costs of convenUonal air polluuon What would happen ff these estimated social costs of pollution and shadow value of carbon dmxlde ermsslons were charged to users through fuel taxes9 Doing so would rinse the average fuel tax within the United States by $0o63-$1o50 per 6Based on one ton carbon content for every 335 gal refined petroleum product, calculated from Manne and Rachels (1992) , p 59, and 1992 average fuel consumptaon of I gal per 21.7 rmles, from U S Bureau of the Census (i995) table 1042 Prices are deflated by the consumer pnee index for all 1terns, from U S Bureau of the Census (1995), table 76I gallon 7 a sh~a'p increase from its current value of about $0.35 per gallon (U.S Bureau of the Census, 1993, table 1015) Nevertheless, it would leave U S. fuel taxes well below most European Ievels (Pucher, 1988) European fuel taxes, whtle no doubt curta~mg automobile use somewhat, have not prevented it from growing at about twice the U S. rate for two decades (Pucher, 1995) These cost esumates, then, crude as they are, support two conclusions Ftrst, people place a high value on the environmental zmpacts of motor ve~cles, as measured by willingness-to-pay to reduce the known health effects and to adopt measures to figrestall the unknown but potentaally devastating clmaatac effects But second, thus value appears to be well below that which would m~cate a wilhngness to reverse the longstanding shift toward hlgh levels of automobile ownership and use Substanlaal expenchtures to reduce atr emissions from automobiles may be jusufied by quantitative economic analysis, but dracoman measures to reduce the use of motor vetucles are not Fortunately, there is no real dilemma m th~s posmon. Du-ect measures, both technological and behaworal, exist wluch could greatly reduce the enwronmental effects of motor vehicles w~thout having much effect cn their overall use For example, theIe as strong evidence that a small fraction of cars cause a d~s-propomonate fraclaon of emissions of air pollutants, 8 hence a rather small effort to anprove mspecuon and maintenance of the highly sophsUcated pollutlon control devzces on ca~s would probably greatly reduce automobile emasslons (Glazer et al, 1995) The fuel efficiency of new cars m the U S has been greatly improved at acceptable cost, under the pressure of fuel price increases and the mandate of corporate aveIage fuel economy (CAFE) standards Narrowly targeted restncuons on motor ve~tcles, such as bans m selected areas with hlgh pedestrian potentaal, can conl~ol some of the worst pollutaon and no~se Lrnpacts w~thout substanually changing the ,role of motor vehacles m urban life
Motor-vehicle accidents
Motor-vebacIe accidents accounted for about 42 000 deaths and anywhere between 2 0 m~lhon and 5 7 mdhon mjunes m the Umted States m 1993 9 They are the leading cause of death for people aged I to 24 ~o Motor-vetucle accidents are 7Adding the lower bounds of pollution and glob~d wamung costs just estimated yields $0 008+ $0 021 = $0 029 per aule, and adding the upper bounds yields $0 038 + $0 031 = $0 069 per male These two numbers are zonverted to an eqmvalent fuel tax by mulupiymg by average fuel economy of 21 7 males per gallon SSee S~lrnan ,rod Bishop (1990), Lawson et al (1990) therefore a sigmficant public-health problem, just as they are m western Europe where fatahtms per vetncle-nule traveled are somewhat higher Yet motor-vehicle accidents do not seem to have stamulated the same kind of pubhc response as some less easily measured problems such as the health tmpaets of &et, exerc:se, or envtrortmental pollutants. For example, certain suspected carcinogens, such as chrysotile (a form of asbestos) and the less-chlonnated forms of polychlormated b:phenyls (PCBs), are subject to extremely strict regulatmn desp:te lack of agreement w:thm the sclentafic commumty on whether they pose any slgmficant pubhc-health risk (Stone, 1991 , Abelson, 1991 ). Why :s there pubhc support for dracoman measures to hmnt the use of unproven carcinogens, while practacally no support for comparable measures to hrmt the use of motor vehlcles9
As another mdlcataon of the puzzle, the per-rmle accident costs shown m Table  1 are considerably larger than the admlttedly uncertain esttmates of environmental costs &scussed earher The figure of $0 110 per nule ($0 068 per kin) mcludes insurance overhead and a measure of w~lhngness to pay for reductaon m risk of death The latter mcorporates a valuataon of $4.5 rmIhon per statistical life, based on measured wflhngness to pay for small changes m occupalaonal safety, it excludes any sm'ular consideration for injuries, valuing them at just me&cal costs, so :s probably a conservative est:mate [A moderately higher estimate of U S. accident costs as obtained from a study of 1988 acc:dents by Miller (1993)] It as apparent from the table that these accident costs, while substanttal, are not so large as to overwhelm the other costs that people votuntanly bear when driving automobiles For example, they are only 21 percent as large as the first four categories shown m the table, which exclude parking or motor-vehicle taxes. Therefore, we m:ght expect that ff drivers were faced more dtrectly with these accident costs than they are now, they rmght take greater measures to reduce acc:dents, but these measures would not mchide drastic curtmlment of automobile use Recent marketing trends m the automobile industry confirm that customers are wxllmg to put up substanual sums to :mprove safety, for exampIe by paying for antflock brakes, an" bags, and other safety features (McCarthy~ 1990 , Calfee and Winston, 1993 . Mamaenng and Winston, 1995 If this ~s so, what justtficatmn ~s there for any government intervention? There are at least three arguments Ftrst, the w~despread use of insurance reduces the mchwdual's incentive to pay voltmtanly for safety measures that would reduce accident costs Second, because insurance rates bear only an mdarect relatmnsh:p to the amount of dnwng, the insurance system may be causing drivers to perceive what really :s a vanabte socml cost (accidents) as a fixed private cost (insurance) Fmally, a considerable fraction of accident costs, perhaps half, are external to the mdlwdual dr:ver, borne instead by pedestrians, b~cychsts, occupants of other vetucles, the pubhc-health system at large, and pubhcly financed pohce depart-
AAMA (1995), p K A Small / Regzonal Sczence and Urban Economics 27 (i997) 671-691
681 merits and court systems (Vlckrey, 1968 , Newbery, 1988 Jansson, 1994) . (Of these three categories, the mtemser extemahty is a marginal externality cost not included m Table 1 , the others are social costs included m the table but not m drivers' private cost calculalaons)
It ~s difficult to translate such cons~deraUons into optamal user charges, because accadent externahttes are addressed m complex ways through tort law, cnmanal law, and insurance regulalaon (Boyer and Dmnne, 1987) Nevertheless, we can obtain some insight into the mammum potenual behavmral unpacts of such user charges Su~?pose an extreme case. that none of" the average accadent costs m Table  1 are now percewed by users as variable costs, and that all of them are incorporated into a new mandatory insurance program pa~d for through a fuel-tax surcharge. This would be a more drasuc versmn of "pay-at-the-pump" proposals for insurance reform currently being considered m the U.S., although it still would not mtemattze the mteruser externahty At current rates of fuel consumpuon, such a policy would add $2 47 per gallon ($0 63 per later) to gasohne prices Whale tins figure is ha~her than those dascussed m cormectaon with air polluuon and global warming, it stall does not dafter greatly from fuel-price differentials between the Umted States and several European nataons (U S Bureau of the Census, 1995, table 1400) A deterrent of this magmtude might make a notaceable difference motor-vehxcle use, but the European experience suggests that it would not place a permanent 6rake on Its growth I conclude that even m the absence of other measures to reduce the danger of accidents, charging people the socml cost of accidents would lead at most to only moderate changes m overall use of motor vehicles. But in fact, reducing overall automobile use ~s a ve~ clumsy way to address the specafic problem of motor vehicle acctdents, just as it is to address air pollntaon Experience shows that at costs far tess than the value people place on antomobfle travel, technological or behavmral measures to reduce accident rates and their seventy can be put m place Th~s is m fact exactly what is happening m the Umted States Many road Improvements have been made with traffic safety as an objective. Increasingly stnngent safety regularaon has added $1000 or more to the price of a car to make It safer ~2 And m a reversal of tradatmnal opposataon to "social engmeenng," federal mcentaves have reduced most states to raise the legal drinking age to 21 m order to reduce automobile accident rates among teenagers Many states have also strengthened laws against dnwng wlule drunk. Apparently, such measures affecting re,ads, vebacles, mad drivers are effective, the rate of traffic fatahtaes per A Small I Regtonal Sctence and Urban Economtcs 27 (1997) velucle-nule m the U S has fallen by more than 50 percent m the last two decades 13
Given the magnitude of the accident costs that remain, it seems tnghly hkely that ad&Uonal such measures are warranted. Further restncUons on dr~vers" use of alcohol, which accounts for a large propomon of accidents, seem especially prormsmg If safety ~s an mcome-elasUc good, we can expect that the development of further safety measures will be a conunumg process as economac growth proceeds.
Traffic congestion
Traffic conges13on is one problem of urban transportation for whmh there is a solutmn with a strong consensus among transportatton economasts That sohit~on is congestion pricing of hlghways, wtuch means imposing charges on moving traffic for the exphc~t purpose of managing congesuon It therefore entails charges that are high dunng peak periods, and much lower off-peak. Despite severe polmcal drawbacks, congestion pricing is today among the tools sermusty consldered by transportaUon planners.
As a result, the trachuonal acadermc hterature on congestion pricing has now been supplemented by extenslve analyses of the techmcal, a&mmstraUve, and pohUcal prospects for pracucal ~mplementauon (Hau, 1992 , May, I992, U.S. Federal Haghway AdrmmstraUon, t992a, NaUonal Research Council, 1994 , Gomez-Ibanez and Small, 1994 In what follows, I attempt to synthesize these research findings into a few key conclusmns
Concluston 1 congesnon pricing would promote good urban transportatzon
This statement expresses the behef that the theory developed by Plgou (1920) , Knight (1924) , Boiteux (1949 ), Waiters (1961 ), Vlckrey (1969 and others fact apply to real hxghways, and that most of the prechcted efficiency gmns would occur even in a world with imperfect msutuuons for nnplementmg at Urban mobthty m many parts of the world is degraded by the enormous amounts of ume unnecessarily wasted m traffic jams. For example, on the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, aggregate ttme spent m congesuon delay each weekday is esUmated to have grown from 4730 vebacle-hours m 1984 to 10 080 vehicle-hours m 1991 (Dmmar et al, 1994) The total amount of extra travel tmae and fuel consumpuon caused by congesUon, both recurring and occasional, has been valued at an esumated $35 bilhon for 50 large U S urban areas m 1988 (Schrank et al., 1993, p. 46) . The few smmlatton stuches that have beeñ U S Bureau of the Census (1995, table 1033) undertaken, such as those by Keeler and Small (1977) , Motmng (1979 ) Cameron (1991 , suggest that a large proporaon of this extra consumption of tame and fuel would be eltmmated under optamal pricing Feaslbihty stu&es and actual experience with congeslaon pricing, as well as wlth closely related pohcles such as toll rings m three Norwegian cltaes, now provide ample evidence that at least some forms of congestaon pricing are technically and admmlstrauveIy feasible Tins evldence is chscussed further below Therefore congestaon pricing represents more than just a theoretical poss~bhty
Concluston 2 congesnon przcmg ts the only policy that wzll make a noticeable difference in peak congestton levels m the world's most congested cttles
Numerous pohcy imlaatives designed to reduce traffic congestaon, ranging from mass-transit subsidies to land-use restnctaons, have fafl~ to do so (Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez, 1981, Gmhano and Some of these pohcles may create real and substantml benefits, but they can do httle to reduce the most severe congesUon (Downs, 1992) One reason is the erdstenee of latent demand: people who are currently deterred from dnwng at congested times and places by the congestion itself In many tocataons, there is so much latent demand for car travel at peak periods that any amount of capacity that can feasibly be built, or that can be released by enttcmg some drivers off the road, wall qmckly become filled by people who now opt for some alternatave Tins is a well-documented empmcal phenomenon lmown as the "fundarnentaI law of traffic congesUon" (Small, 1992, pp. 112-1!4) , and is explained by a surtple eqmhbnum model exposlted, for example, by Downs (1962 ), Smeed (1968 , Thomson (1977) ; Holden (1989) , Amott and Sraall (1994) If, as suggested earlier, mass transit is provided wath increasing returns to scale, then Iatent demand can have an even more perverse effect In areas with pervasive mass transit, an equihbnum is estabhshed between the ftdd cost of travel by auto and by trarmlt Expanding road capacity then draws users away from mass tranmt, driving up its average cost, until a new eqmlibnum is estabhshed m winch Ingher average costs prevail on both modes" on transit because it is less used, and on Inghways because they are even more congested than bedsore In such a sltuataon, expanding capaclt3' makes congestmn worse! Evidence for such eqmhbna ts provided by Mogndge (1986) , and the phenomenon is formally modeled Downs (1962p; Mogndge et al (1987) and Holden (1989) .
In such a s~tuauort, tmplemenung congestion pricing could produce a modal shift toward no,ass transit that would be accentuated by the resulting decrease m the average full cost of travel by transit It is posmble that a qmte dramatic reductmn m the proportion of travel by automobile might occur m some dense city centers well served by pubhc transit An empmcally based model of such a case is provided by ~VltOn (1983) K A Small / Regional Science and Urban Econoratcs 27 (1997) 63. Concluslon 3 congestton przcmg could a~d the urban economy Increasingly, the urban economy is being drained by the waste inherent in traffic congestion and by the many measures being undertaken to amehorate it, from employer carpoohng mandates to bflhon-dollar expressway wldemngs In a typical large metropohtan area, full-scale congesUon pricing would free up hundreds of n~lhons of dollars of real resources annually for improvements m urban life Those who fear that congesUon pricing would harm crees ecgnoxmcally tend to forget that every dollar extracted from urban travelers through tolls is a dollar that can be used to add urban services, to pay for needed transportaaon improvements, or to reduce other taxes paid by urban resldents and businesses So long as the resources represented by the toll payments remain within the urban economy, the benefits from ehmmaung congesUon will be a pure econormc gain to the region Of course, tl~as qualification requires that the revenues be used m ways that benefit urban residents and businesses. The bxggest danger to success of congestton pricing may be the posslbihty of "capture" of the revenues by special-interest groups, or by planners with good mtennons but poor respect for cost-benefit analysis Revenues could be wasted on l~ansxt systems that are not used, or on highway capaclty expansmns that are no longer necessary There IS a real challenge here for transportauon professmnals we need to prechct the new demand patterns that would emerge from congestmn pricing, and to do so accurately enough to spot unwise expendature plans before it ~s too late CongesUon pncmg could also have Important effects on land-use and commuting patterns For example, st wouid encourage shorter work trips both by reducing the cross-hauhng inherent m present comlnutmg patterns (Gmhano and Small, 1993) and, m the longer run, by promoting 3dbs-housmg balance in land-use patterns A full analysts of land-use imphcaUons, taking Into account chspersed and polycentnc employment patterns, remains to be accomphshed (Deakan, 1994) 
Concluston 4" congestion pricing ~s a respectable pohcy alternative.
The concept of congestion pncmg, having spent Its first 70 years in ~vory tower obhvlon, suddenly became all the rage among tmnsportaUon and pubhc pohcy professionals m the early 1990s. Haghway officials, business groups, transportation engineers, air quality regulators, environmental groups, and even many local bureaucrats began to endorse "market-based' approaches to congestion and an" polluuon after decades of unsuccessful use of other pohcy mswaments.
While pohucal reahUes have intervened to cool the ardor of advocates, there has been some headway even among poht~clans The clues of Bergen and Trondhema m Norway have area pricing schemes that apply only dunng certmn hours Plans that revolve congesuon pricing have been endorsed at various umes by majority pohtical groups m greater London, the Netherlands, Stockholm, and Cambridge (England) (Gomez-Ibanez and Small, 1994 ) I hasten to add that some of the pohtacal figtnes are no longer m power, and earher plans m these regions have been modafied In the Umted States, the private sector is provldmg the first U S congestaon pricing experiment a new four-lane road m tile me&an of the exastmg Raverslde Freeway m southern Cahforma, financed by revenues from a toll s~ueture with sharp variations over the peak period Tins road opened to traffic m December, lC@5
The lead taken by the private sector m Calfforma parallels that taken by SANEF, a pubhcly owned corporataon which operates 1(104 kilometers of French toll roads In Aprtl 1992, SANEF inaugurated a hrmted congestlon-pncmg experiment to flatten the Sunday evening traffic peak consisting mmnly of weekend travelers returning to Pans from the north of France (Gomez-Ibanez and Small, 1994) Thus experiment as revenue neutral --the price as ratsed dunng the peak and lowered during the shoulders of the peak, relatwe to the normal toll Tins pncmg structure enabled SANEF to introduce the scheme wath virtually no redastributwe effects (except among different users of the toll road), a feature winch greatly facihtated its pohtacal feaslbflaty.
Concluston 5" wzdespread adoptton of congestion prtcmg zs not hkely m the foreseeable future
In the United States, especially, the problem of pohtlcal feaslbdlty is a fundamental one Put snnply, the average person on the street tinnks that congestton pricing is a bad Idea The pohlacal habihtaes are severe and present overwhelnung odds against rapid adopuon (Gluhano, 1992 , Rom, 1994 Perhaps finough the demonstration process, people will be eased into the idea g ently and will discover that at is not as bad as they feared There are a number of avenues for introducing congestmn pricing quite naturally as a financing structure for new toll roads, as a mochficatton of the pricing slxueture for erasung toll bridges, as a special measure for a particular "problem area" such as an atrport Each of these offers the olypormmty to demonstrate how pricing can work m practice, although each "also offers the danger of a failed experiment recewmg adverse pubhcxty. Gneco and Jones (1994) suggest that even when not adopted, the serious consaderatlon gnven road pricing m various European locations has allowed the concept to magrate to other locauons Another natural experiment is allow spare capacity on hugh-occupancy velacle lanes to be used, for a fee, by low-occupancy vebacles This effecttvely subjects the low-occupancy veincles to congestaon pricing because only dunng peak hours woutd they wish to pay extra for the special lane, winch m fins case is called a "ingh occupancy toll" (HOT) lane Fielding and Klein ([993) have proposed thts kind of demonstrataon could rmgrate to adjacent 1,rues, as people come to accept and "value the optmn for Ingh-quallty service Indeed, a (subsequently rejected) proposal to gradually toll the enttre Seattle freeway system m just fins manner passed the Wasinngton State Transportation Contrmsslon. In Fall 1996, a
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HOT lane began operation on Interstate 15, north of San Diego (Duve, 1994 , Oropeza et al., 1996 , there are also the several sVadaes being funded under partially defunct U.S. congestion treeing demonstration program Europeans seem somewhat less resistant than cauzens of the Unked States to the kind of state mterventaon that road pricing represents, a conclumon supported by the agreements already reached m Scanthnavia Polhng data from Norway and England suggest that people may support pricing strategaes when used to finance desn'ed pubhc expenchtures (Jones, 1991 , Trewlk, 1992 .
Conclusion 6" congestwn ts an inherently self-hmmng phenomenon
Usually when congestion gets too bad, people stop doing the things that cause It. We are therefore not doomed, even m the absence of sound pohcles, to everworsemng congesuon and hopeless urban gndlock Ttns does not mean there ~s no problem, it just means that there as an mefficmnt eqmhbnura rather than an unstable posmve feedback loop The self-Imntmg charactenslac of congestmn is m contrast to several other urban problems such as racml intolerance and short-run fiscal health (Bradbury et al, 1980) .
One example of ttns self-hrmtmg characteristic ~s the tendency of people to relocate m order to avoid congestion Tl,as probably explains the finding that even though congestion seems to have increased on specxfic faclhtles (Schrank et al., 1993 , Meyer, 1994 , average commuting tame has not increased (Gordon et al, 1991 , Plsarskl, 1992 Employment and housing have suburbamzed, enabling many commuters to keep a step ahead of congestion as It follows them outward Another amehoratmg factor is that automobile ownership and use appear to be approaching saturaUon Lave (1992) ~hows that growth m regastered automobiles per driving-age adult has nearly leveled off m the U.S., with Europe not too far behind Reasons mctude two demograp~c facts: people who grew up before driving was wrtually a umversal skill are now a small nnnonty, and women's labor-force pamc~pauon has now reached approxamately the same level as men's Added to this is a secular growth m incomes that has finally penmtted v~rtually every driver to own a car It is possible that these forces will take hold before congestion pricing catches on and wIlI undermine ~ts support If so, urban areas may remain stuck m aa inefficient transportation system, but one that people deem tolerable
Concl~on
Quantitauve econon'acs is not the only vantage point from whach to examine transportatmn pohcy, but at can at least focus attenuon on a range of sensible optaons. I have argued that doing so for the case of urban transportation m the Umted States provades some strong gmdance as where not to look for soluuons:
namely, widespread reducuon of motor vehicle use Far more defensible are targeted pohcms that use either pricing or regulatory measures to bring about technologlca~ or behavioral changes that reduce mr ermssions, enhance safety, and reduce congesuon. Fmanclal problems of Infrastructure management and transit subslches are amenable to rattonallzauon that would greatly reduce cost In the case s of air polluuon and safety, measures already undertaken seem to be having the demred effects Thus is not to argue that the precise measures chosen are necessanIy file most efficmnt ones, or that the correct tradeoff between econonuc costs and saiety improvements has been achieved However, the success of such measures renfforces the mmn argument made here: that the fundamental approach most beneficial to people's welfare is one that induces nucro changes m behavior and technology, aimed chrecfly at the problem, mid not one which aims to effect broad changes m mobxhty patterns None of tins is meant to imply that drastic changes in the amount of motorvehicle use should not occur m selected locatmns Congestion pncmg would certainly curtml, though not chromate, peak-period use mcurrentIy congested areas It as entirely possible that bans or restncuons on motor vehicles m selected neighborhoods are justified m order to n'nprove the residential or pedestrian environment Furthermore, a thorough-going reform of pricing and investment pohcles toward urban transportatzon m urban areas might produce drastic increases m use of puhhc transit m selected commuter markets, especlaUy m dense central business districts Thus efficient pohcles would produce urban areas with quite altered features, but those areas would conunue to depend heavily on motor vehicles
